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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
KUTV, INC., a Nevada 
corporation, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 3 
vs, 
MOTOR SALES, INC. , a Utah 
c o r p o r a t i o n , dba FEDERAL 
MOBILE HOMES, 
Defendant-AppeIlant. 
CASE NO, 
13987 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
MOTOR SALES, INC. 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought by the Plaintiff contending 
that the Defendant ordered television advertising and to -
recover the reasonable value of the advertising services. 
The services were alleged to have been rendered between 
September 1973 and February 1974. The Defendant contends 
the advertising was not authorized and further that the 
Plaintiff paid to an agent of the Defendant a secret com-
mission and that any resulting agreement made by the agent 
and the Plaintiff as a result of the fraud and collusion 
was void. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Trial Court ruled that the agents of the Defendant Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
had apparent authority to contract for the advertising 
services of the Plaintiff and awarded a judgment against 
the Defendant in the sum of $11,180.00 together with costs 
of court and interest. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Defendant-Appellant, Motor Sales, Inc., seeks a 
reversal of the judgment of the Trial Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Defendant, a Richfield Company, commenced doing 
business in the Salt Lake County area approximately May 1, 
1973. Dewey Sargent was the General Manager of the Defendant 
Company. The Defendant company placed in charge of the Salt 
Lake Office an agent by the name of Harold J. Bowen who had 
an assistant by the name of Jim Martin. Both agents sold 
house trailers on a "commission only11 compensation basis 
(R143 L30). Harold J. Bowen had no authorization to make 
purchases or incur any expense over the sum of $250.00 
(R144). During the month of May 1973, Harold J. Bowen made 
a contact with an agent of KUTV. An advertising proposal was 
presented to the Defendant and the advertising contract was 
authorized by Dewey Sargent of Motor Sales, Inc. The adver-
tising account was paid through the month of August 1973. 
Harold J. Bowen, without authorization, contracted with 
the Plaintiff for additional advertising services and without 
the knowledge of the Defendant or its general manager or any 
of its officers, Harold J. Bowen was given an expense paid 
9 
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trip for • wc \ •• Mazatlan, Me> 11 u •. o : hcrcaoer, • 
Harold J, Bowen executed an audit, ior.al contract which 
would have given him a five day, V- , ^ 
- :.- •. >ca*. )<-i! trip for four".in San Juan, Puerto 
Rico (R121) . The contract committed Motor Sales ~_rie. 
t 0 a n advertising budget in the amount of b, ,( 0 
for a period of time from December 1 \9:'\ \ hru February 
28, 1974. The contract was not discovered . »• .= .iy of the 
principals of Motor Sales, Inc/''untilrthe mom h of 
February, 1974 when a copy was mistakenlv mailed to the 
Motor Sales, Inc. Richfield Orfio; • - "l ^  • .-'J) . - ue 
secretary, of KuTY who had mistakenly mailed the contract 
immediate!}5 ca1'ed the Richfield Office of the Defendant 
-vand requested thai. '•• ho oonr :\-K.; r>* ^-Lurned immediately 
since she was apprehensive iha: she would loose her ioh 
-unless It came ^aok T <.> hov because -:
 :< • ;: hv .*..•. • 
the Defendant received 001 ice that there was a ^oru'^isiv 
and secret contract, between the agent of the Defendant 
which gave the as^m - ••«*-' -e" , •. m- i : :• nance the
 <A:;-,v, 
Defendant to spend large amounts ror advertising with 
{
 he Plaintiff company. A copy of the f,KUTV San J-on 
Holiday11 contract I s at :tached' as appendi x : ^:ic : he 
previous contract was identified as in substantially -
the same form and under which Bowen v. - .^ /iv.i 
to Mazatlan, Mexico ;. 
The principals oh Moior Sales, Inc. were .^ 1 
.aware of the collusive o- ^* -ao:
 ;
 i
-> -•
 s . * - •.  o . i o n e c 1 •  :r.; 
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and Harold J. Bowen, the beneficiary under the 
contracts, stated that the benefits from the contract 
were
 t o
 inure to him personally although he regarded it 
somewhat unusual since he "never won a trip for spending 
money" before (R170 Lll). However, he regarded the 
contract for his personal benefit (R170 L18; R171 L6). 
A R G U M E N T 
POINT I 
A PRINCIPAL IS NOT BOUND BY CONTRACTS MADE BY 
HIS AGENTS, EVEN THOUGH WITHIN THE SCOPE OF 
AUTHORITY, WHERE THE AGENT HAS AN INDIVIDUAL 
INTEREST AND ACCEPTS A SECRET COMMISSION TO 
ENTER INTO THE CONTRACT. 
There is no dispute in the evidence that the 
KUTV Account Executive, R. K. Cardwell, contacted 
Harold J. Bowen and secured advertising for the month 
of September, October, November and December of 1973. 
The advertising was induced by a KUTV Mazatlan, Mexico 
Holiday Contract in which Harold J. Bowen, agent for 
Motor Sales, Inc. secured an expense paid trip to 
Mazatlan, Mexico. Further there is no dispute in the 
evidence that Harold J. Bowen also executed a contract 
in which he committed $7,000.00 in advertising in order 
to secure a I!Fun in the Sun11 Holiday in San Juan, Puerto 
Rico. The Mazatlan, Mexico Holiday Contract was in all 
respects similar to the San Juan Holiday Contract intro-
duced into evidence as Exhibit fl7M and attached for 
reference as appendix i. The principals of Motor Sales, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Inc. were never aware of either contract at the time 
of their execution. It.was only through an error made 
in the mailing office of KUTV that the MSan Juan Holiday" 
contract came to light (Rl49)r" Although R. K. Cardwell 
was aware the billings for advertising went to Richfield 
either directly or indirectly, he at no time advised any 
of the principals of: the company of either advertising r 
contract (R129-130). Each contract offered a reward to 
an agent who would induce Motor Sales, Inc. to spend -- — 
substantial sums of money. •••••-:w:^"%. 
Public policy has long denied the validity of 
contracts1 exitered int0rwhere an agent has been influenced 
in his contact by a secret commission or gratuity. The 
Utah Legislature has made such conduct a criminal offense. 
Included in the Utah Criminal Code under "Fraud" is - " 
Section 76-6-508,U.C.A. 1953, which reads as follows: 
76-6-508 BRIBERY OF OR RECEIVING BRIBE BY PERSON^:,, 
IN BUSINESS OF SELECTION, APPRAISAL OR CRITISIM ' 
OF GOODS OR SERVICES: 
(1) A; person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor 
when, without the consent of the employer or 
principal, contrary to the interests of the 
employer or principal: 
(a) He confers, offers, or agrees to confer 
-upon the employee, agent, or fiduciary of an -
employer or principal any benefit with the 
"* purpose of influencing the conduct of the 
employee, agent, or fiduciary in relating to 
his employer's or principal's affairs. 
- 5 -
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• The legislature seeks to correct a situation 
where a gratuity or commission is given directly 
to an agent to influence his judgment in entering 
into contracts which are binding upon his principal. 
In the event such conduct were permitted, the agent's 
judgment is at best suspect since one of his motives 
is to obtain a personal benefit for himself. Under 
such circumstances the principal is not liable on 
contracts made by his agents as a result of collusion 
with the third party, although otherwise the agent 
may have acted within the scope of his authority. 
The payment or agreement to pay a secret commission, 
bribe or gratuity to the agent by the third party as 
an inducement to enter into the contractural relations 
on behalf of the principal is such collusion as to 
entitle the principal to avoid the contract, although 
the principal may have received some benefit. 
This matter was carefully considered by the New York 
Supreme Court in the case of Sirkin vs. Fourteenth Street Store, 
108 New York Supplement 830. An action was brought against 
the Fourteenth Street Store to recover $1555.81, being the 
purchase price of certain hosiery and wrappers sold and 
delivered by the Plaintiff to the Defendant. The Defendant 
was a corporation conducting a department store in the City 
3CJS Section 421 Agency, Page 276 
- 6 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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of New York and the Plaintiff was a manufacturer, 
of or a dealer of goods. The defense to the pur-
chase contract was that the Plaintiff for the purpose 
of inducing the purchase of goods by the Defendant 
purchasing agent, agreed to pay a sum equivalent to 
5% of the purchase price of the goods ordered. The 
Lower Court entered a decision favoring the Plaintiff 
because the goods had been delivered and holding that 
^ it* would be inequitable for the Defendant to retain •^•: 
the goods and also to decline to pay for them. -• —* 
In reversing the decision of the Lower Court, the 
SupremeCtmrt; of New York cited New York Penal Code which 
made it a misdemeanor to "corrupt influencing^of agents, 
employees or servants by the giving of any gift or 
gratuity whatsoever.!f 
The court then held a contract made in violation 
of a criminal statute, although not expressly prohibited 
or declared to be void, is prohibited, void and unenforce-
able whether executory or executed. The Court held: 
"It is manifest that the legislature 
in enacting this criminal statute 
intended to emphasize and extend the 
public policy of common law, which 
Tendered such contacts by agents for 
their own benefit void. It being the .-:?. 
providence of the legislature to declare 
the public policy of the state, it is 
the duty of the court to be guided 
thereby in administering the law . T;. 
nothing could be more corrupting, nor 
have a greater tendency to lead to 
disloyalty and dishonesty on the part 
of servants, agents and employees, and 
- 7 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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to betray the confidence of the 
the trust reposed in them, than 
these practices which the legis-
lature has endeavored to stamp 
out; and I think nothing will be 
more effective in stopping the 
growth and spread of this corrupting 
and now a criminal custom than a 
decision that the courts will refuse 
their aid to a guilty vendor or vendee, 
or to anyone who has obtained a contract 
by secretly bribing the servant, agent, 
or employee of another to purchase or 
sell property or to place the contract 
with him . . . public policy requires 
that an agent, servant or employee 
shall perform the duties of his 
employment involving discretion and 
trust, with a single purpose of 
serving his master or employer, for 
the salary or compensation which he 
has agreed to pay, has the right to 
expect honest, faithful, loyal services 
rendered with a sole regard to his 
interest. The tenancy of this 
practice (permitting individual 
gratuities or commissions) is to 
make the servant disloyal and to 
have his action not only influenced, 
but controlled, by his personal 
interests, rather than by duties 
of his employment . . . the vise 
lies in making the agreement with-
out the knowledge of the master." ,,K . .; 
The same question was also considered in Standard 
Lumber Company vs. Butler Ice Company by the Circuit Court 
of Appeals of the United States for the Western District 
of Pennsylvania, 146 Federal Reporter 360. In that matter, 
the Plaintiff, Standard Lumber Company, brought an action 
against the Defendant, Butler Ice Company for material 
and labor in a certain construction contract for the 
erection of an ice plant. The president of the Defendant 
company was paid $2,000.00 to influence the Defendant 
- 8 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
company in entering into the contract. The Court 
refused judgment to Plaintiff holding the contract 
was not only immoral, but it was illegal and criminal 
and therefore void. No court would be justified in 
enforcing, the whole or any part of said contract. 
The United States Circuit Court of Appeals, 
Sixth Circuit considered a similar question ip the 
case of American Ship Building Company vs. Commonwealth 
SS Company,, 215 Federal Reporter 296. The American 
Ship Building Company constructed and delivered a 
ship to Commonwealth SS Company for the price of 
$385,000.00. It was agreed that the Plaintiff would 
pay a commission of $15f000.00 to agents of the Defendant, 
which commission, was not disclosed to the Defendant 
officers. The court authorized recission by the buyer 
because of the fraud and then considered certain 
equitable matters since the ship had been used for a 
period of over six years. 
;
 Under statutes such as the one adopted by the 
Legislature of the State of Utah making the payment 
of a seciret commission or bonus to an agent a crime, 
it has been generally held that resulting public policy 
would forbid an action for the price of goods sold and 
o 
delivered or for work, labor and materials furnished. 
3CJS Section 421 Agency, Page 276 
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This court has consistently declared contracts 
unenforceable where the legislature has enacted 
3 
a statute to protect the public. 
C O N C L U S I O N 
Defendant's agents Bowen and Martin were granted 
a trip to Mazatlan, Mexico in October of 1973 for 
inducing advertising purchases by the Defendant from 
the Plaintiff and thereafter entered into a contract 
to induce the Defendant to spend an additional $7,000.00 
in committed advertising funds (R128). The bribe or 
gratuity was never disclosed to the Defendant or any 
of its principal operating officers. Under this circum-
stance, the Utah Statutes and public policy will not 
permit an action for the price of the advertising 
service extended by the Plaintiff in such a manner 
as to seriously influence or undermine their loyalty 
to a principal. We submit the contract for the 
advertising services is void and the judgment of the 
Lower Court should be reversed since it authorizes 
payment for services rendered under such circumstances. 
Respectfully submitted, 
TEX R. OLSEN 
Olsen and Chamberlain 
76 South Main 
Richfield, Utah 34701 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
ZOlsen vs. Reese 200 P2d 733; 114 Utah 411 
Eklund vs. Elwell 211 P2d 849; 116 Utah 521 
Lyman vs. Taylor 384 P2d 401; 14 U2d 362 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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KUTV "SAN JUAN"^HOLIDAY 
YOU RECEIVE: 
Five days and four nights of "Fun in the Sun" for two in San Juan, Puerto Rico 
April 3 thru April 7, 1974. 
Your excursion includes the following: 
A. Round trip air transportation for two from Salt Lake International Airport 
via DC8 regular airlines chartered jet. 
B. Deluxe room accomodations for four nights (based on double occupancy) 
at the Americana Hotel. 
C. One cocktail party; one hour; unlimited beverage, all taxes and 
gratuities included. 
D. Transfers including luggage handling. 
E. Luggage handling in and out of hotel. 
NOTE: Airport taxes; service charges, taxes and tips at hotel ARE NOT 
included. 
:i. FOR: 
A $3500. committment in air time to be run between December 1, 1973 
and February 28, 1974. 
The $3500. cost must be over and above any expenditure made by your company 
or agency during the above dates and must also be over and above any 
committment previously made "for the above dates. 
The $3500 committment is to be used in air time to be selected from 
availabilities at applicable rate card costs. Holiday price does not 
include production of commercials. 
An agency may combine account expenditures to participate. No company 
or agency may purchase more than two holiday schedules for themselves. 
[II. COST: 
1973 Expenditure 0 1974 Committed Expenditure lOOO 
Total Cost of Holiday Schedule 70O6 \ 
; tfdloiO 30u)Eta of feOf,/AL P'OSf/fty^ accept the KUTV "San Juan" 
>ffer. Our ( f i rm) (agency) guarantees to schedule $ lOQO in spot announcement 
dvert is ing on KUTV from December 1 , 1973 to February 28, 1974. I understand that the 
ioliday schedule must be completed and paid for by March 15, 1974- and that th is contract 
s f i rm and non-cancellable. 
ubmitted by: 
>^uxvx 
KUTV Account Executive / v Signature 
\- -^- ^ ^ ^ L ^ ^ j ) teo^ofii. Mp&itG Afcy^s 
Name Name of Business 
Uacicl) <=>QL^_ i M f r ^ y ^ ^ Jic-tiTsCiO U+£t> 
s-A T i t l e Address 
Mt&^JU+X^, < • -> „ 
c
'f*m& ExfcbH ^J/_-J7 "X'l 2> ,q^a 
NO. _ _ 4 S a _ < 2 - ^ _ _ . •' D a l * o f t r i p Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
